Monetary policy operating procedures: the Peruvian case by Choy, Marylin
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Monetary policy operating procedures:
the Peruvian case
Marylin Choy
Bank of International Settlement
March 1999
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34966/
MPRA Paper No. 34966, posted 23. November 2011 22:58 UTC
186
Monetary policy operating procedures:
the Peruvian case
Marylin Choy Chong
1. Background
(i) Reforms
At the end of 1990 Peru initiated a financial reform process as part of a
broad set of structural reforms which enabled a series of markets to be
liberalised, such as the financial and labour markets. Among other things,
these reforms granted equal treatment to local and foreign investment.
The objective of the reform programmes was to give the market a
greater role as resource allocator.
In order that both interest rates and the distribution of financial
resources would be determined by the market, the central bank started
a process of financial deregulation,1 liberalising interest rates and the
exchange rate as well as abandoning various administrative measures
which restricted the functioning of the financial system.
A new banking law was enacted in 1991 (amended in 1996) which
established universal banking as well as the Basle Committee guidelines
concerning capital adequacy and consolidated supervision, among other
aspects. Likewise, a deposit insurance system was introduced to replace
the state guarantee which formerly covered customer deposits. At 
the same time, the functions and objectives of the Superintendency 
were redefined as the supervisory and controlling entity, while the
preservation of monetary stability became the sole objective of the
Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
As part of the financial system reform, the state commercial banks
were privatised and the state development banks were liquidated
together with other insolvent financial entities.
1 Such as lowering reserve requirements and eliminating selective credit controls, interest
rate subsidies and subsidised lines to specific sectors.
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(ii) The financial market
In 1990 the financial market was basically restricted to the banking
sector. Practically the only financial option consisted of bank deposits,
since there were almost no negotiable securities issued by private firms.
Liquidity (currency + deposits with financial institutions) had declined
from over 200/0 of GDP in the 1970s to just 40/0 in 1990. This was the
result of the hyperinflation in the 1980s that culminated in an inflation
rate of about 7,5000/0 in 1990. Furthermore, more than 700/0 of liquidity
was held in dollars as a protection mechanism against hyperinflation.
Liquidity is now almost 190/0 of GDP although the degree of dollarisation
is still high: more than 600/0 is held in dollar deposits, in spite of the
reduction of the inflation rate to 70/0 in 1997.
Real interest rates in new soles were at one time highly negative
because of the administration of nominal interest rates. Financial libera-
lisation corrected this distortion in interest rates (see Table 1).
At present, the capital market is gradually growing, leading in turn to
the emergence of fixed income securities, encouraged by the appearance
of institutional investors such as mutual funds2 and private pension fund
managers.3
The banking system is made up of 25 private banks, representing 
900/0 of the financial system. As of December 1997, foreign holdings
amounted to more than 350/0 of total banking equity while foreign loans
to local banks totalled US$ 3,330 million. Total deposits in the banking
system were US$ 11,800 million (just over 180/0 of GDP). The four
largest banks held 710/0 of total deposits, while 15 banks held only 130/0
of total assets. Concentration and segmentation are therefore present in
the Peruvian banking system. Other entities making up the financial sys-
tem include seven financial firms, ten leasing companies, 13 municipal
associations and 16 rural credit firms.
2 Having grown more rapidly since 1996, mutual funds under management as of December
1997 totalled US$ 515 million, of which 230/0 was invested in the banking system.
3 The appearance of these funds was a consequence of the 1993 reform of the pension fund
system replacing the pay-as-you-go scheme by a system of individual capitalisation accounts
managed by private firms. At the time of writing, private pension funds under management
totalled US$ 1,400 million (450/0 invested in the banking system, 190/0 in corporate bonds and
340/0 in equities).
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The opening of the financial system and macroeconomic stability have
allowed local companies direct access to the capital market to finance
their operations, albeit still for limited amounts. Despite this progress,
the capital market remains small and there is still no developed
secondary market, particularly for Treasury bills.
2. Monetary policy design
Up to 1990 the central bank implemented its monetary policy in a
setting of expansionary fiscal policies and strict controls on foreign
exchange and capital flows. The central bank had three aims – monetary
stability, strengthening and stability of the financial system and support 
to economic growth and employment – which usually implied opposing
objectives and constrained its effectiveness.
As a result, monetary policy aimed at reducing financial pressures
induced by fiscal policy, mainly using direct instruments: reserve require-
ments, selective credit controls, and interest rate and foreign exchange
controls. However, this policy generated financial repression, hyper-
inflation of more than 7,000 in 1990 and a severe recession.
Table 1
Interest rates1
At an annual rate
Local currency US dollars
Savings deposits Loans2 Savings deposits Loans2
Nominal Real3 Nominal Real3 Nominal Real3,4 Nominal Real3,4
1980 30.5 –18.8 32.5 –17.6 .. .. .. ..
1985 50.0 –41.9 68.7 –34.7 .. .. .. ..
1990 888.7 –87.2 1,674.3 –77.1 8.3 –47.4 15.0 –44.2
1995 12.5 2.1 33.3 21.0 5.3 1.3 16.6 12.1
1996 11.0 – 0.8 26.1 12.8 4.9 5.7 16.0 16.8
1997 10.7 3.9 30.0 22.0 4.6 2.7 15.3 13.3
1 Annual average. 2 Short-term loans. 3 Calculated on the basis of cumulative annual inflation.
4 Devaluation is calculated using the exchange rate set in the banking system.
Source: Central Bank of Peru (BCRP).
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(i) Purpose
As already mentioned, in 1992 financial reform modified the legal frame-
work within which the central bank operated. Its sole purpose became
the maintenance of monetary stability and its autonomy was clearly
established. The central bank's monetary policy objective is therefore to
control inflation, for which it establishes an annual inflation target range
and uses the control of monetary aggregates as its intermediate variable.
In order to achieve its prime objective, the monetary authority 
exerts strict control over the monetary base, employing for this purpose
a monthly monetary base growth target. The reasons for using this 
target are that in Peru inflation expectations are closely related to the
expansion of the monetary base, and that the central bank has control
over this monetary variable. The central bank increases or reduces the
monetary base by managing both its internal and external sources, that
Table 2
Fixed income securities
Stocks, in millions of US dollars
End- End- End- Sept.
1994 1995 1996 1997
Treasury bills1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 323 297 279
BCRP certificates of deposit . . . . . . . . . 160 190 31 2342
Privat sector bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 595 1,054 1,210
Financial institutions bonds . . . . . . . . . 236 387 582 696
Leasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 291 371 440
Subordinate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 96 211 256
Non-financial institutions bonds . . . . . . . 89 208 472 514
Plain corporate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 168 432 514
Convertible corporate . . . . . . . . . . . 40 40 40 0
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 780 1,108 1,382 1,723
As a percentage of GDP . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4 1,8 2,2 2,4
One year or less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 190 66 272
1 year to 3 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 244 295 229
3 years to 5 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 422 777 874
Over 5 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 252 245 344
1 Includes US$ 232 million held by the central bank. These Treasury bills were issued to
capitalise the central bank. 2 The stock as at 11th December 1997 was US$ 244 million.
Source: BCRP.
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is, credit from the central bank and factors related to foreign currency
with local money creation implications.
The management of these variables permits the central bank to 
inject or withdraw liquidity from the economy, affecting the monetary
aggregates. To do this, it relies mainly on market-oriented instruments.
(ii) Monetary Programming
At the beginning of each year, a monetary programme is constructed,
that is based on the macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts and is consistent
with the announced inflation target. Thus, liquidity flows are projected 
on the basis of the forecasts for production growth and inflation. The
multiplier, together with the demand for currency and bank reserves is
used to forecast monetary base growth. The source of growth in the
monetary base and in credit to the private sector are determined and
macroeconomic consistency is analysed. This programme, which includes
monthly targets for the monetary aggregates, is periodically revised in
order to ensure its consistency with the development of the fiscal and
macroeconomic variables.
The central bank’s day-to-day monetary management is based on 
a daily estimate of banking system liquidity, calculated from a series of
indicators such as banks’ cash balances, current account balances kept at
the central bank, the system’s reserve position, the level of interbank
interest rates, the net cheque clearing position and banks’ net foreign
exchange position. Using this liquidity estimate, the central bank decides
whether to inject or withdraw liquidity from the market.
3. Monetary policy instruments
Within this new free market setting, the central bank has varied 
the way in which and the objectives for which the monetary policy
instruments are utilised. For example, before the stabilisation programme
was started in 1990 and 1991, monetary policy instruments were applied
with the purpose of granting multisectoral credit support, including to
the Government, either through central bank credits or the channelling 
of funds under the credit control arrangements. At present, however,
the exclusive purpose of the monetary instruments is the control and
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management of the monetary base, the final objective being to reduce
inflation. Preference is given to market mechanisms.
The central bank uses its instruments to eliminate excess liquidity in
the banking system so as to reduce the volatility of interbank interest
rates and avoid inflationary pressures. The major instruments are
described below.
(i) Reserve requirements
Reserve requirements seek to control monetary growth, through a
lower bank multiplier which counteracts the effects of a larger monetary
base or the inflow of foreign capital into the financial system.
Since 1991, the importance of reserve requirements as a direct
instrument of monetary policy has gradually diminished, since liquidity
management depends increasingly on intervention in the foreign
exchange market and open market operations. The rules presently in
force are:
• The central bank establishes which liabilities of the banks are subject
to reserve requirements and what constitutes reserve funds.
• The reserve period established by the central bank is one month.
Control is based on daily averages and deficits carry a penalty rate
significantly higher than the market lending rate.
• The minimum legal reserve ratio cannot be set at a level higher than
90/0; nevertheless, for monetary policy reasons the central bank can
establish additional or marginal reserve requirements.
At present, the minimum reserve ratio is 70/0 and there is a marginal
reserve requirement of 450/0 for foreign currency deposits (introduced in
1994). The central bank remunerates the additional reserves in foreign
currency at a rate equivalent to LIBOR less 13/80/0. The minimum reserves
do not bear interest.
In practice, reserve requirements mean a tax on lending rates.
Nonetheless, some important benefits can be gained. The high reserve
requirement in foreign currency seeks to reduce both the pressure
exerted by capital inflows on the exchange rate to appreciate and the
monetary growth that can occur due to this dollar flow, which is beyond
the central bank’s control. It should be stressed that approximately 
700/0 of deposits are in foreign currency. The marginal reserve
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requirement of 450/0 for foreign currency deposits4 also means that there
is a substantial reserve with which to meet unexpected foreign currency
outflows which could put the financial system at risk.
(ii) Open market operations
The central bank is increasingly using open market operations to regulate
market liquidity, sterilising excesses or injecting new soles when needed
by the market, so as to keep the monetary base and liquidity within the
target range. The monetary base is reduced through the placement of
central bank certificates of deposit and is expanded by repurchase
agreements against these certificates or their redemption.
As there is no market for Treasury bills, the principal instrument
employed to absorb excess liquidity is the sale of certificates issued by
the central bank. The maturity of these instruments varies from four to
12 weeks and sales are organised through auctions where the central
bank pre-announces the total amount of certificates on offer. The main
intervening agents are banks and institutional investors, which notify 
to the central bank the amount of certificates they wish to acquire,
together with the respective interest rate. The central bank ranks offers
by interest rate and accepts them up to the maximum amount
announced in the auction. Interest rates on central bank CDs constitute
a market signal as to the direction of monetary policy.
In late 1997, the central bank started implementing repurchase
agreements on its own securities. These operations are used as a mech-
anism to inject very short-term (overnight) liquidity into the system.
Repos take place through an auction procedure in which the central
bank announces the amount while the price is determined by the
market. This is also a multiple price auction; hence, the banks agree 
to pay different interest rates for the central bank's resources. The
availability of these funds is immediate.
These repurchase operations enable both more precise monetary
management and better treasury management by the banks, as they use
their financial assets to obtain short-term liquidity. As a result of these
operations, banks' excess reserve funds have decreased while demand for
4 As a result of the marginal reserve policy, the average reserve ratio is approximately 430/0
of foreign currency deposits.
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central bank CDs has increased, given that banks can use them to cover
periodic liquidity needs.
Interbank interest rates used to fluctuate widely in response to
seasonal changes in liquidity. Large amounts of excess liquidity at the
beginning of the month and large deficits in reserve positions during the
tax collecting week made the interbank interest rate very volatile.
However, since these fluctuations lasted only a few days, other interest
rates did not show a similar degree of volatility, although in a sense they
represented a cost that put a floor on other interest rates.
The introduction of repurchase operations has thus been also instru-
mental in promoting the stability of interbank interest rates (see Graph
2), as they enable banks to reduce excess reserves; these previously
represented the main source of funds available to banks to cover
occasional liquidity needs.
(iii) Collateralised credit
The central bank may grant credit against collateral in order to provide
temporary liquidity assistance to the financial system. It is very short-
term, usually overnight, which means that the resulting monetary base
Graph 1
Bank’s average excess reserves
In percentages
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growth is temporary. It usually offsets the contraction in banking system
liquidity generated by a variety of factors such as tax payments. The
maximum term of these credits is 30 days and the maximum amount 
of credit that a bank may receive is the equivalent of its equity,
with recourse to the facility limited to a maximum of 90 days within any
360-day period.
During the week of tax collection, banking system deposits are trans-
ferred to the Treasury’s financial agent, Banco de la Nación, to pay tax
liabilities. These fund flows result in temporary illiquidity in the banking
system, which is offset by the combined use of repurchase operations
and collateralised credits. Interest rates on these credits are generally
higher than those on repurchase operations. The total of credits granted
against collateral is decided at the end of the day, after the results of
Graph 2
Interbank and central bank’s credit rates
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intervention in the foreign exchange market and of open market opera-
tions. Likewise, as the use of repurchase operations increases, it is
expected that collateralised credit will be used only in emergencies and
as a last resort.
(iv) Public sector deposits
Monetary policy is implemented in close cooperation with fiscal policy,
both being aimed at controlling inflation. During the last years, the
government has generated a primary surplus that has enabled it to 
keep resources in the financial system. In order to facilitate monetary
management, these government resources are kept at the central bank,
their effect being similar to the issue of central bank CDs. These deposits
make it possible to sterilise the liquidity generated by the central bank’s
need to intervene in the foreign exchange market, without exerting
additional pressure on interest rates. Public sector deposits within the
central bank, provided they are term deposits, carry a similar interest
rate to central bank CDs.
The Treasury is also obliged to deposit its daily cash surpluses with
the central bank through Banco de la Nación. This is to prevent Treasury
funds generating opposite liquidity flows to those of other monetary
policy instruments, especially during the tax collection period.
(v) Foreign exchange swaps
Foreign exchange swaps are available for financial institutions. However,
since Peru does not have a developed forward market, this instrument
differs from traditional swaps so as to avoid the danger of sending wrong
signals to the market about the central bank’s exchange rate view.
Foreign exchange swaps have an implicit interest rate. However, if the
exchange rate change is higher than this implicit rate, the central bank
charges the higher rate. This transfers the exchange rate risk to the
commercial banks.
The uncertainty of their cost (which depends on changes in the
exchange rate the following day) and the probability that it will be higher
than the rediscount rate mean that the use of foreign exchange swaps is
limited.
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4. Intervention in the foreign exchange market
(i) Objective
Over the last few years, the central bank has had a major presence in 
the foreign exchange market. Given high capital inflows, extensive dollar-
isation of the economy and the absence of Treasury bills which could be
used to supply financial resources, the central bank has been using its
dollar purchases to inject liquidity.
Foreign exchange intervention consists mainly of the purchase 
and very occasionally the sale of dollars by the central bank, which
consequently affects the monetary aggregates through the injection and
withdrawal of liquidity.
The central bank’s foreign exchange market intervention is carried
out in accordance to the monetary targets. The monetary effect of every
intervention generating excess liquidity therefore has to be sterilised so
as to obtain the desired change in the monetary base; this is achieved
through open market operations.
Foreign exchange intervention also seeks to counteract undesired
and temporary exchange rate fluctuations, generated either by specula-
tion or by the financial system's seasonal liquidity requirements. This,
however, does not mean that the central bank bases its intervention on
exchange rate bands. Rather, the strategy is to avoid abrupt short-term
exchange rate movements which could have undesired repercussions on
inflation or the competitiveness of tradable goods.
(ii) Factors determining intervention
The intensity of intervention in a given period is determined by the 
path of the monetary variables, forecast in the monetary programme.
This forecast establishes the flow of base money consistent with the
expected demand for money and with the inflation target.
There are essentially two causes of base money flows: dollar
purchases by the central bank and central bank credit growth. If the
projections are for an increase in money due to central bank credit,
base money growth induced by dollar purchases must be adjusted in line
with the final programmed flows of base money. If for any reason, dollar
purchases turn out greater than the original estimated amount, the
excess base money must be sterilised through open market operations.
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Once the monetary framework and the volume of dollar purchases
are determined, the central bank decides on the form and amount of 
the daily interventions. The daily management of the currency dealing
room is based on decisions that chiefly take account of foreign exchange
developments and financial system liquidity.
Financial system liquidity is characterised by marked seasonal
fluctuations during the month, mainly due to tax payments. During tax
collection periods, which usually last a week, a transfer of resources takes
place from the private sector to the government, involving a transfer
from the commercial banks to the Banco de la Nación and generating a
liquidity shortage for commercial banks. To compensate for this shortage,
banks usually seek credit from the central bank or sell dollars, thereby
inducing an appreciation of the exchange rate, even in the run-up to the
tax collection period.
In the last few years, Peru has seen large inflows of foreign currency
into the financial system, which have been a major factor in increasing the
dollar supply in the foreign exchange market and caused the exchange
rate to appreciate. In order to counteract both liquidity shortages and
pressure on the exchange rate, the central bank has intervened more
heavily by buying dollars in the foreign exchange market. (Conversely,
when the currency has tended to depreciate, the exchange rate is subject
to a depreciation pressure, intervention has decreased (see Graph 3).
Another factor in the central bank’s decisions regarding dollar
purchases is the Treasury’s need for dollars to service foreign debt.
In doing so, the Treasury buys dollars from the central bank, thereby
withdrawing new soles from the financial system. The central bank buys
foreign currency in the market to meet the Treasury’s requirements,
and replenishes the liquidity in local currency. Hence, the larger the
Treasury’s needs for foreign currency, the larger the central bank’s inter-
vention volume in the foreign exchange market.
The daily variables that determine the system’s liquidity, as well as the
capital inflow, can show an unexpected behaviour during the programme
period. For this reason, the central bank can intervene, if necessary, for
volumes in excess of the programmed flows depending on the required
increase in base money. Larger purchases of foreign exchange by the
central bank are then sterilised through open market operations.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that intervention requiring
sterilisation entails a financial cost for the central bank. Hence, the
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central bank’s purchases are subject to an upper limit. This limit is raised
when the fiscal position supports the monetary policy stance. For
instance, a fiscal surplus, with fiscal savings kept as deposits with the
central bank, could enable the central bank to buy more dollars.
(iii) Intervention mechanism
The central bank buys and sells dollars at interbank exchange rates. The
Monetary and Foreign Exchange Operations Committee meets daily to
establish the intervention guidelines with regard to the amounts involved
Graph 3
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and the reference prices. On this basis, the dealing room defines the
strategy to be followed in terms of:
• purchase amount per telephone call;
• number of quotes permitted per telephone call;
• quantity of calls or sessions per day;
• operation closing price.
In line with the proposed strategy, the operators engage in daily
transactions through the dealing system and by telephone. At present,
31 institutions are authorised to operate, 28 from the financial system 
and three belonging to exporters’ associations (National Mining and
Petroleum Society, Exporters National Society and Exporters Associa-
tion).
To make intervention as transparent as possible, communication
between the central bank and participating dealers is via Reuters, to
which the exchange rates at which the central bank buys or sells foreign
currency are reported. Communication takes place in the order in which
the institutions’ calls are received.
Intervention takes place in “firm” dealing sessions, based on the
amount decided by the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Operations
Committee: agents quote buy and sell rates for a given amount to three
decimal places and the central bank can then accept either rate.
Dealing sessions work with multiples of US$ 100,000. They are con-
ducted at variable time intervals, depending on the scale of intervention
and on market activity. Dealing starts at 10:30 and closes at 12:30.
In general, the central bank only intervenes by buying in the market.
The purpose is to smooth out occasional large exchange rate variations,
but always in line with the financial system’s liquidity needs and the
increase in base money projected in the monetary programme. In the
event of speculative attacks on the local currency, the central bank
prefers to increase interest rates rather than sell dollars.
(iv) Results
Dollar acquisitions by the central bank are practically the only source 
of expansion of the monetary base. Likewise, as is shown in Table 3,
whenever dollar purchases greatly increase base money, the effect is
sterilised through the placement of central bank CDs or public sector
deposits. Sterilisation was especially pronounced in 1994 and 1997.
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The growth in base money has also enabled the financial system’s
local currency liquidity to grow. While still at relatively low levels,
the monetisation coefficient, measured as the ratio of local currency
liquidity to GDP has shown a marked recovery from less than 30/0 in
1990 to approximately 70/0 in 1997.
Dollar purchases by the central bank have also led to a strong
recovery of net international reserves. Thus, from the negative level 
of US$ 105 million in July 1990, reserves have grown substantially,
reaching US$ 10,202 million in November 1997.
The central bank’s net foreign exchange position (defined as net
international reserves less its domestic liabilities in foreign currency),
which was negative (US$ 1,071 million) in July 1990, turned positive in
April 1992 (US$ 44 million) and reached US$ 2,272 million in November
1997.
Table 3
Source of base money variations
Flows, in million of new soles
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
(Jan.–Nov.)
I. Foreign sources . . 496 403 1,289 770 150 1,360
US$ million . . . 386 203 597 345 60 510
a. Dealing room net
purchases . . . . 657 417 1053 653 1,240 1,355
b. Net sales to the 
public sector . . . –285 –192 –447 –314 –1,188 – 846
Public foreign 
debt . . . . . . . –125 – 24 –374 –235 – 802 – 682
c. Other . . . . . . 14 – 22 – 9 6 8 1
II. Internal sources . . 21 49 –420 216 188 –1,217
a. Central bank
CDs . . . . . . . 0 – 12 –338 – 91 359 – 844
b. Rediscounts . . . 3 – 17 – 10 4 103 – 40
c. Public sector
deposits . . . . . – 16 19 – 66 – 33 – 427 – 595
d. Other . . . . . . 34 59 6 336 153 182
Total (I +II) . . . . . 517 452 869 986 338 143
Source: BCRP.
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Finally, the central bank’s strict monetary management combined with
a policy of fiscal discipline, has enabled inflation to be reduced to single
figures.
Both international reserves as well as the net foreign exchange
position have reached sufficient levels to back not only one year of
merchandise imports, but also the total monetary base. Thus, inter-
national reserves amount to the equivalent of almost seven times the
volume of base money, while the net foreign exchange position is almost
one and a half times the same variable.
5. Concluding remarks
Both the objective and the powers of the central bank are clearly
specified in its legal framework. In this respect, its aims and activities are
transparent and explicit.
Monetary policy influences the monetary aggregates through market
instruments, sending clear signals to economic agents regarding the
direction and objectives pursued.
Table 4
Central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, net foreign
exchange position and net international reserves
In millions of US dollars and percentages
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
(Jan.–
Nov.)
Dealing room net 
purchases (flows) 315– 928 657 417 1,053 653 1,240 1,355
Net foreign exchange 
position –315 –55 311 595 1,179 1,601 1,718 2,272
Net international 
reserves 531 1,304 2,001 2,742 5,718 6,641 8,540 10,202
Inflation 7,649.6 139.2 56.7 39.5 15.4 10.2 11.8 5.8
Real GDP growth 
(0/0) – 3.8 2.9 –1.7 6.4 13.1 7.2 2.6 7.9*
* To October.
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Despite major changes in monetary policy management, policy
implementation still encounters problems. The main problems are:
• A modest quantity of money: total liquidity (including deposits in local
and foreign currency), i.e. the quantity of money in circulation in the
economy, is equal to just over 180/0 of GDP with a high degree of
dollarisation (almost 750/0 of total deposits is in foreign currency). The
persistently low level of local currency means that seasonal liquidity
flows, generated for example by tax payments, can become quite large
in relative terms.
• The central bank’s capacity to buy foreign exchange is restricted 
by the cost of sterilisation. This may induce a rise in interest rates,
in turn attracting larger foreign capital inflows and leading to an
appreciation of the exchange rate.
• The dealing room’s intervention strategy has improved; however, it is
still restricted to buy dollars, while maintaining a passive stance when
the market requires a larger dollar supply.
• Financial market segmentation: the financial market is made up of
groups of institutions of widely different size and performance.
Interinstitutional behaviour is therefore not homogeneous. Market
segmentation creates situations in which the system as a whole can
show a liquidity surplus, while on an individual basis some banks are
encountering liquidity problems. Institutions with liquidity problems
do not have access to interbank loans, owing either to the market’s
inefficiency or to the institution’s specific situation. This creates 
a need for collateralised credits, bringing about an increase in the
monetary base, despite the excess reserves in the system as a whole.
As these entities’ demand for central bank CDs is usually small, the
scope for repurchase operations as a source of funds is limited.
